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Abstract
Software based fault isolation (SFI) is a powerful ap-
proach to reducing the impact of security vulnerabilities
in large and critical C/C++ applications like Firefox and
Apache. Unfortunately, practical SFI tools have not been
broadly available.
Developing an SFI toolchain is a significant engineer-
ing challenge. Only in recent years have browser vendors
invested in building production quality SFI tools NaCl/P-
NaCl to sandbox mobile code. Further, without committed
support, these tools are not viable, e.g.,NaCl has recently
been discontinued, orphaning projects that relied on it.
WebAssembly (Wasm) offers a promising solution—it
can support high performance sandboxing—and has been
embraced by all major browser vendors—thus seems to
have a viable future. However, Wasm presently only offers
a solution for sandboxing mobile code. Providing SFI for
native application, such as C/C++ plugins or libraries
requires additional steps.
To reconcile the different worlds of Wasm on the
browser and native platforms, we present Gobi. Gobi is a
system of compiler changes and runtime support that can
sandbox normal C/C++ libraries with Wasm—allowing
them to be compiled and linked into native applications.
Gobi has been tested on libjpeg, libpng, and zlib.
Based on our experience developing Gobi we offer a
detailed analysis of how SFI developers can address the
difficult challenge of maintaining an SFI toolchain long
term. We conclude with a call to arms to the Wasm com-
munity and SFI research community to make Wasm based
module sandboxing a first class use case and describe how
this can significantly benefit both communities.
Addendum: This short paper was originally written in
January of 2019. Since then, the implementation and de-
sign of Gobi evolved substantially and some of the issues
raised in this paper have since been addressed by the
Wasm community. Some challenges still remain. We thus
left the paper largely intact and only provide a brief up-
date on the state of WebAssembly tooling as of November
2019 in the last section.
1 Introduction
Software-fault isolation (SFI), introduced in 1993 [29], is
an effective technique for reducing trust in software com-
ponents in both userland and kernels [28]. But the dom-
inant mechanism for module isolation today is process-
based privilege separation and sandboxing [6,23], not SFI.
Process-based isolation carries with it IPC overhead that
can be substantial for tightly coupled modules. In this
paper, we argue that WebAssembly, developed for accel-
erating Web content, is a viable basis for general-purpose
SFI that is performant and maintainable.
Unlike process-based isolation, SFI does not enjoy
instruction-set support on widely deployed processors.
Accordingly, SFI vendors need to develop and maintain
their own compiler backend (to rewrite modules to re-
strict memory accesses), their own linker and loader (to
install modules in the host address space), and their own
base library and ABI (to facilitate interaction between
the module and the outside world). This is a large un-
dertaking. Google’s Native Client (NaCl) SFI effort was
largely rewritten in the port from 32-bit x86 [30] to 64-
bit x86 [26], and the most recent version of LLVM for
which Google has supplied NaCl backend patches is 3.7.0,
released in late 2015.
WebAssembly (Wasm) [14] has supplanted NaCl for
high-performance Web content sandboxing in browsers.
It is a viable basis for general purpose SFI. Wasm al-
ready provides the core SFI guarantee: isolated mod-
ules can access memory only within a single region. Un-
like NaCl, Wasm was designed for hosting isolated mod-
ules in-process, rather than in a dedicated NaCl process.
And Wasm’s popularity—it is implemented in all major
browsers [18]—means that it is supported by a robust and
growing toolchain ecosystem.
We have built a prototype Wasm SFI system, called
Gobi. Our experience highlights several shortcomings of
the current Wasm ecosystem for applications beyond Web
content acceleration. Some shortcomings are already be-
ing addressed by the community. For example, browsers
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use their existing JIT infrastructure to compile Wasm
bytecode to machine code. For host processes that don’t
already include a JIT, a standalone machine code gen-
erator is needed—and is currently being developed as
Cranelift [8]. Others are not currently being addressed.
For example, the C/C++ ABI implemented by Wasm com-
pilers and browser hosts has not been standardized or even
fully documented. We sound a call-to-action to the Wasm
community to address these shortcomings.
Gobi is intentionally designed to minimize changes
to the Wasm compiler, even at the cost of some perfor-
mance. We are working to upstream our changes to the
Emscripten compiler. We describe the design decisions
we made to maximize the maintainability of Gobi within
the Wasm ecosystem.
Preliminary compatibility and performance evaluation
of Gobi supports the feasibility of Wasm as a base for
general-purpose SFI. To date, Wasm performance has
been compared against JavaScript performance, not native
code. Perhaps as a result, the bounds-checking techniques
employed by current Wasm runtimes are well behind the
SFI state of the art. We thus sound a call-to-action to
SFI researchers to adopt Wasm bytecode as an SFI in-
termediate representation and to bring high-performance
sandboxing to Wasm.
2 Prototype
Our positions in this paper stem from our experience build-
ing Gobi. Therefore we briefly discuss the various require-
ments addressed by Gobi to leverage Wasm for module
sandboxing.
By itself, Wasm provides an essential building block—
memory isolation, i.e. a module can only access its own
memory. However, we must safely use this memory iso-
lated module in the application. In this section, we use
an example of an image decoder application that wishes
to use libjpeg (a JPEG decoding library) in a sandboxed
manner. To setup, we compile an unmodified libjpeg with
our custom Emscripten compiler to produce a Wasm mod-
ule, which is in turn compiled with a Wasm compiler, such
as Cranelift, to produce an ELF library that is used with
the Gobi runtime.
Runtime. To run Wasm modules like libjpeg, we should
only require a simple standardized Wasm runtime for
which multiple open source implementations exist [3, 16,
25]. This runtime provides basic functions for Wasm mod-
ule setup—providing APIs to extend or free memory for
the Wasm module, mechanisms to correctly handle traps,
implementation of data structures for indirect function
call support (the Wasm specification requires all indirect
calls to go through the runtime to ensure memory safety).
In practice, the libjpeg Wasm module also requires the
Emscripten specific “embedding” runtime. This runtime
is providing support for C primitives and platform ABIs
such as stack and heap separation in the address space,
primitives for setjmp and longjmp, threading primitives,
floating point primitives and clock/time primitives. Em-
scripten provides this runtime for Wasm as used on the
web, it does not provide this runtime for non-web embed-
dings. We bridge this gap in Gobi.
Syscalls. The libjpeg Wasm module needs to invoke
syscalls (e.g., for I/O or logging). However, Wasm only
supports a small number of memory related syscalls in
the Wasm runtime. Other syscalls are either unsupported
or unofficially supported in the Emscripten embedding
runtime. Gobi thus provide support for several syscalls,
ensuring compatibility while retaining memory isolation.
Module sandboxing APIs. To safely use the sandboxed
libjpeg module the Gobi runtime also provides several
APIs to application code:
I Function Calls. The application calls into libjpeg to
parse the JPEG image. However, the application and
the libjpeg Wasm module have ABI differences. We
provide an API that accounts for ABI differences (e.g.,
function name mangling, struct parameters, etc.).
I Memory Allocation. The application and libjpeg must
share data such as the parameters of function calls. To
allow controlled sharing, we provide an API that allo-
cates memory in Wasm module memory. This memory
is accessible to both the library and the application.
I Pointer Swizzling. Pointers in the Wasm libjpeg mod-
ule are to be represented in the format specified in
Wasm standard—indexes into the Wasm memory. We
thus provide APIs to convert or “swizzle” pointers to
the Wasm representation and its reverse.
I Callback Registration. The application may need the
Wasm libjpeg module to invoke some application func-
tions. For example, libjpeg needs to invoke an error
handler application if it encounters a parsing error. We
thus provide an API to register callbacks.
I Threading. To safely support multiple application
threads calling into libjpeg simultaneously, we must
create a new Wasm stack for each calling thread. We
thus provide an API to create a new stack in the Wasm
module which is called for each application thread.
Compiler modifications. For the application and Wasm
libjpeg module to be compatible, they must have compati-
ble machine models—identical sizes and alignments for
datatypes such as an int, long and the size of a pointer.
In practice these are not the same: the application uses the
default machine model of the target platform, however, the
Wasm libjpeg module uses the machine model dictated
by the Wasm standard and toolchain. We resolve these
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differences by modifying the machine model used by Em-
scripten when compiling Wasm modules, taking care to
minimize the amount of changed cod (see Section 3.1).
3 Challenges in SFI module sandboxing
In this section, we address what has been a historical chal-
lenge for SFI—maintaining an up to date runtime and
compiler toolchain. Typically, SFI compiler toolchains
are implemented as forks of existing compiler toolchains.
These toolchains either require substantial engineering ef-
fort for maintenance or are simply unmaintained and lag
behind when it comes to bug fixes, optimizations and lan-
guage support. For instance, the NaCl compiler toolchain,
when supported, required significant engineering effort to
keep up with upstream changes, while research toolchains
such (e.g., Memsentry [19]) are often not updated beyond
their first release.
Below we show how various design choices in Gobi
are explicitly made to keep it maintainable in the long
term. These choices are not tied to the Wasm-based mod-
ule sandboxing and may useful to other SFI compiler
toolchains. We believe that SFI runtimes and compiler
toolchains must similarly and explicitly make design
choices that consider maintainability.
3.1 Maintaining Compiler modifications
As described in Section 2, machine model differences
must be resolved in Emscripten to ensure compatibility
of the application and sandboxed module code. Machine
model changes, however, can lead to large changes in
compiler implementations: several compiler phases (e.g.,
the code generation phase for all pointer instructions),
optimizations and instructions (e.g., pointer instructions
need to use different register classes) have to be adjusted
to deal with the changed machine model. This is an ex-
pensive engineering effort. In our experience porting the
machine model of the NaCl toolchain, this could take up
to 4 months of engineering. Worse, the resulting toolchain
changes are both hard to maintain and difficult to merge
back upstream.
The alternate option of avoiding compiler modifications
and transforming all data as it crosses between the appli-
cation and the sandboxed module (and vice-versa) has its
own drawbacks. In particular, this requires us to perform
deep object copies as they cross the boundary. For lan-
guages like C and C++, this is not only slow, but is hard to
do automatically as this process would require accurately
tracking the underlying types of void*, sizes of C arrays
etc. Works such as PtrSplit [20] optimize overhead for this
by tracking this information only for potentially shared
data; however, this still incurs overheads of about 13%
and cannot be used for multi-threaded programs. We pro-
pose an alternative approach that that minimizes compiler
changes without giving up on performance.
Our key insight is that most machine model differences
can be resolved with trivial code modifications with the
exception of pointer size differences. We can thus adjust
machine model difference such as the size of int and
long 1, the padding and alignment of datatypes, and struct
field padding in the Wasm compiler toolchain and leave
handling pointer size differences to the application.
To test the viability of this approach, we implement
the proposed changes which requires a small patch of
approximately 150 LOC to Emscripten’s Clang frontend.
Further, we also examine how we can efficiently handle
pointer size difference at the application level below.
Handling differences in pointer size. Pointer size differ-
ences are resolved through a combination of application
level data conversions and Emscripten modifications. To
illustrate our solution, we discuss how the module sand-
boxing APIs(from Section 2) along with compiler modifi-
cations resolve differences for 3 pointer related datatypes.
Pointers. Wasm pointers are 4 bytes, while application
pointers are 8 bytes on 64-bit platforms. We modify point-
ers to be the appropriate size as part of the swizzling APIs
described in Section 2.
Struct containing a pointer field. To ensure structs contain-
ing pointers are compatible when crossing the application
module boundary, we modify Clang to ensure pointer
fields are aligned to 8 bytes and have a trailing padding
of 4 bytes. This causes the field offsets of the structs in
the Wasm module to be identical to the field offsets of the
same struct in the application.
Structs containing an array of pointers. Structs with a field
of type void*[] must be made compatible when cross-
ing the application module boundary. Unfortunately, we
cannot use the prior approach of adding trailing padding
after a pointer element, the C ABI does not permit ar-
rays to have padding between elements. We therefore use
an alternate approach. First, to ensure that the structure
sizes are the same for the application and the sandboxed
module, we modify the Wasm toolchain to add trailing
padding after the entire array equal to the size of the array.
Second, we provide an API to the application that modi-
fies the array in place to use the “sandbox” representation
of 4-byte pointer elements when structs are copied from
the application to the sandboxed module and vice-versa. 2
While this second step imposes a runtime cost, transfer-
ring arrays of pointers is relatively rare in practice which
makes this an acceptable trade-off.
1Since different operating systems and architectures use different ma-
chine models, the user specifies the target machine model via a compiler
flag.
2This same approach is used for parameters and returns of an array
of pointers outside a struct
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We note that while usage of such APIs may be in-
convenient for developers, we believe it is possible to
ensure such conversion APIs are automatically invoked
in languages such as C++ which have strong meta-
programming capabilities.
3.2 Maintaining syscall support
As described in Section 2, Gobi provides support for
syscalls. Providing and maintaining safe syscall support
requires substantial engineering effort. Syscalls must re-
tain compatibility and functionality while ensuring mem-
ory isolation. A syscall specification in the Wasm stan-
dard would both improve Wasm compatibility and ease
Wasm module sandboxing maintenance; the WebAssem-
bly System Interface (WASI) [10] partly addresses this
need (though was not available when we started our work
on Gobi, see Section 7). We believe the SFI community
should maintain a generic syscall support layer providing
access to POSIX syscalls, that is adaptable to different
SFI toolchains and is guaranteed not to break isolation.
A good starting point here would be to use the existing
implementation from the NaCl project and generalize it
further. While, ongoing engineering effort would still be
required to ensure maintenance for this code, we believe
this is tractable: the syscall support may be restricted
to commonly used syscalls—a list that does not change
frequently. As a consequence of these challenges, wider
support for syscalls in Gobi is currently an ongoing engi-
neering effort.
4 Challenges in Wasm tooling
In the implementation of Gobi, we encountered several
limitations in Wasm tooling that hindered our use of Wasm
as an SFI toolchain. While some of these limitations are
because the tools are relatively new, we believe others to
be more fundamental and open problems. We describe
the challenges and possible workarounds below.
Generating binaries. Tools such as Cranelift or Turbofan
currently only support JIT compilation of Wasm modules,
and cannot produce ELF binaries. We therefore use the
wasm2c tool [3] which provides a one to one conversion
of Wasm instructions to C statements. We compile the
generated C code 3 using a C compiler to produce an ELF
binary that is memory isolated. In the future, compiling
Wasm modules in this circuitous manner can be avoided
as Cranelift aims to support ahead of time compilation of
Wasm modules.
Runtime. As described in Section 2, while we can lever-
age one of several maintained Wasm runtime implemen-
3The generated C code resembles assembly — this is in no way
related to “decompilation” of the Wasm module.
tations to allow module sandboxing, providing an Em-
scripten embedded runtime represents a fundamental
weakness as the embedding runtime has not been stan-
dardized and is an adhoc set of functionality required by
Emscripten. To address this challenge, Wasm would need
to either standardize this so that the community may easily
develop embedding runtimes, or alternately, Emscripten
must maintain the non-web embedding runtime upstream.
We note there are some new efforts to standardize the
C-Wasm ABI [5] as well as some open source projects
that aim to provide this non-web embedding runtime such
as wasmer [4], however these are very nascent efforts and
are missing large portions of the Emscripten runtime. As
a consequence of this non-standardization the embedded
runtime support in Gobi is only partial.
No linking support. Wasm sandboxed modules are cur-
rently dynamically loaded and do not support static or
dynamic linking due to toolchain limitations. First, the
toolchain generates common symbols for all Wasm mod-
ules causing name collisions when applications link mul-
tiple Wasm sandboxed modules. But, even if this problem
is solved, per-session sandboxes (creating multiple sand-
boxes for the same module) would still result in name
collisions. From our experience, we believe such chal-
lenges are more difficult to address than at first glance,
and urge the Wasm community to explicitly take this up
as part of Wasm tooling standard. Until then, we can eas-
ily provide APIs that simplify working with dynamically
loaded modules and provide the same type-checking guar-
antees as static linking.
Threading. Gobi does not currently allow multiple
threads simultaneously executing code in the Wasm mod-
ule as we found Wasm thread support in Emscripten to
be buggy. Wasm threading is brand new, and we believe
these bugs will soon be resolved.
5 Is Wasm usable for module sandboxing?
To ensure there are no fundamental limitations in using
Wasm for module sandboxing we evaluate three questions.
I Compatibility. Can we easily sandbox any library?
I Correctness. Do our tooling modifications or APIs
cause incorrect behavior in modules?
I Performance. Is the overhead of Wasm module sand-
boxing reasonable?
5.1 Compatibility
To ensure compatibility of Wasm sandboxing we sandbox
3 commonly used open source libraries—libjpeg, libpng
and zlib. First we modify the build scripts to use the
custom Emscripten toolchain to output a Wasm module.
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We then use wasm2c and a standard C compiler to produce
an ELF binary. Finally, we combine this with the Gobi
runtime to produce the final library.
We find that while the Wasm toolchain retains a high
compatibility with existing code, providing a complete
embedding runtime implementation remains challenging
as addressed in Section 4. Each new library we sandbox
highlights different portions of the embedding runtime
that we have missed and are forced to implement.
5.2 Correctness
To ensure the correctness of our Wasm sandboxing imple-
mentation, we must test that the libraries maintain correct
behavior after 3 different stages—when they are compiled
with our modified Wasm toolchain, when the libraries
are used with the Gobi APIs and when the libraries and
API are used in real world applications. First, to ensure
our toolchain preserves libraries behavior, we ran the test
suites for libjpeg, libpng and zlib all of which pass. Next,
we created a test-suite for our APIs to ensure that both
basic sandboxing functionality as well as edge case con-
ditions such as data type overflow and memory isolation
boundary addresses work correctly. Lastly, to ensure the
libraries work in real world use cases, we modify the
Firefox web browser to use these three Wasm sandboxed
libraries, ensuring that Firefox produces identical web
pages and images in all cases.
5.3 Performance
To understand the performance overhead of Wasm sand-
boxing, we measure the overhead of a simple application
that decodes JPEG images and re-encodes the images at
a different quality when using a sandboxed libjpeg. We
also make some basic performance optimizations to the
wasm2c toolchain eliminating bounds checks as described
in the Wasm specification [14]. We measure the overhead
to be 85%.
While the overhead here is high, we believe this is
mostly due to the current state of Wasm tooling. For in-
stance, wasm2c itself imposes large overhead and does
not apply any SFI specific optimizations such as using a
dedicated register to store the base address. Long term, the
Wasm community is informally targeting reducing over-
head to around 20% [2], putting it in the same ballpark
as efficient SFI toolchains like NaCl. We believe applica-
tions may be willing to accept this overhead especially if
the overhead is not on the critical path. For instance, we
have tested that Firefox has no user visible slowdown on
web-pages when using sandboxed image libraries having
20% overhead.
6 Empowering Wasm and SFI communi-
ties
In this section, we discuss how the Wasm and SFI re-
search communities can work together and benefit from
improving Wasm module sandboxing.
Benefits to the Wasm community. The Wasm commu-
nity needs high performance memory isolation and the
SFI research community has a long history of investigat-
ing hardware and software techniques for efficient iso-
lation code on commodity hardware [12, 13, 19, 21, 24,
26, 30]. Many of these ideas could be applied to Wasm .
Indeed some hardware based isolation techniques achieve
overheads as low as 5%, much lower than Wasm’s unoffi-
cial performance targets.
Call to action for the Wasm community. To facilitate
SFI performance research on Wasm, the Wasm commu-
nity must address two limitations that hinder its use as
an SFI toolchain. First, the Wasm standard and tooling
restrictions listed in Section 4, such as incompatible ma-
chine models and lack of embedding runtime standards
must be addressed. Second, the Wasm standard must take
great care during design so that they do not accidentally
disallow performance optimizations.
To illustrate this, we give two examples. First, Wasm
separates the stack and heap, i.e., the linear memory.
Isolating the control transfer information—the return
address—prevents classic stack smashing attacks. Un-
fortunately, it’s not clear if separating local variables and
function arguments meaningfully prevents data-only at-
tacks [15]: most languages, when compiled to Wasm, will
have to compile at least part of their stack to the untyped
linear memory. (Richer types could have meaningful bene-
fits though [11].) This design choice does, however, makes
it more challenging to use hardware features such as In-
tel MPK [17] to efficiently enforce isolation; the current
Wasm design, for example, would require switching be-
tween two separate keys—one for the linear memory and
one for the stack.
Second, Wasm’s CFI is similarly unnecessarily strong.
Indirect jumps are only permitted if the target is a func-
tion with correct signature. NaCl, instead, optimizes CFI
requirements by permitting jumps to any 32-byte aligned
address and carefully padding instructions, trading better
performance for larger binary sizes. Indeed, NaCl style
CFI can be enforced purely in hardware in newer Intel
CPUs using Intel CET [1]. The current Wasm standard has
disallowed such trade-offs due to its CFI choice despite
the fact that memory safety is not violated.
We believe the Wasm standard should embrace flexi-
bility where possible, and allow implementations to ex-
plore different trade-offs. In the web scenario, this would
allow browsers to choose between different Wasm imple-
mentations depending on the target platform’s memory,
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operating system and hardware primitives.
Benefits to the SFI community. The SFI community can
leverage Wasm for a task that has historically been very
challenging—ensuring the availability of a well main-
tained SFI toolchain. It is likely that this would signifi-
cantly increase the use of SFI in industry software, making
SFI much more commonplace. A secondary benefit of a
standard well maintained toolchain to the SFI research
community is the ability to easily compare trade-offs be-
tween different SFI techniques in a uniform manner.
Call to action for the SFI community. Wasm is a place
where SFI optimizations can have a huge impact on real
world code. SFI researchers should ensure their solutions
are compatible with Wasm so that the software industry
benefits from their improvements to SFI. In leveraging ex-
isting platforms such as Wasm as an SFI toolchain, the SFI
community must try to minimize the amount of changes
to the existing toolchain so that the changes are maintain-
able. We show how this can be done in Section 3. Finally,
the SFI community should view the Wasm standard as
an intermediate representation (IR) for SFI and must ac-
tively participate in the Wasm standards process to ensure
that the IR does not rule out specific SFI optimizations or
implementations.
7 Updates as of November 2019
This paper was originally written in January of 2019. Over
the last year, some of the issues raised in this paper have
been addressed by the Wasm community. The most sig-
nificant changes for Wasm based module sandboxing are
the creation of (1) WASI (WebAssembly System Inter-
face) [10] and (2) Lucet, a standalone Wasm compiler
toolchain [22]. We discuss the impact of these below.
WASI is a Clang backend that produces Wasm binaries
that do not require an embedding runtime (such as the
Emscripten embedding runtime discussed in Section 2).
Instead, the produced binaries use WASI-libc [9], an im-
plementation of libc that is compatible with Wasm. Not
having to provide an embedding runtime greatly simpli-
fies the use of Wasm toolchains for library sandboxing.
Lucet is a standalone compiler built on top of the
Cranelift code generator that can generate an ELF bi-
nary from a WASM module. While, Lucet eliminates the
circuitous route of generating binaries we have relied on
thus far, it currently has some limitations. At the time of
writing, Lucet does not provide a convenient way to reg-
ister and unregister callbacks dynamically [27]. Further,
despite being a dedicated Wasm compiler, it still incurs
significant overhead—using Lucet in the benchmark dis-
cussed in Section 5 incurs a 110% overhead.
Despite current limitations, the importance of the above
tooling and specifications is well acknowledged. A recent
effort called called the ByteCode Alliance [7] aims to
bring together various tools and specifications such as
Lucet, WASI, Cranelift, multiple Wasm runtimes under a
single umbrella.
However, even with the availability of better tooling,
many challenges in using Wasm based library sandboxing
remain, including compiler modifications due to ABI dif-
ferences (Section 3.1), linking and threading support (Sec-
tion 4), performance limitations (Section 5.3), challenges
in using hardware primitives to enforce Wasm guaran-
tees (Section 6). We thus, reiterate our call to the Wasm
and SFI research communities to work to improve Wasm
module sandboxing as both communities can get signifi-
cant benefits from high quality and performant sandboxed
tooling.
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